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Preface  
The objectives of this literature review are to organise current knowledge of decentralisation 
and corruption, to discuss the major controversies within and across disciplines, and to 
identify some areas in most need of further research, with an emphasis on questions relevant 
to development policy. It has been compiled from a number of sources: from books and 
articles, library searches, internet sources (such as Transparency International and the World 
Bank bibliographies), and from conferences and colleagues. Special thanks to the CMI 
librarians for their assistance, and to the Utstein Anti-Corruption Resource Centre 
(www.U4.no), which commissioned the study.  
 
The study, which was conducted in July 2003, focuses on academic research. While a survey 
of the output from public service reform secretariats and consultancy reports would be useful, 
they are not covered here. Moreover, to make the survey accessible to a multidisciplinary 
readership, efforts have been made to present the more abstract and technical research in a 
non-technical way. In spite of its limitations, we hope the review will be considered useful by 
researchers, development practitioners and aid officials. 
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1 Introduction 
Decentralisation has become an important theme of governance in many developing countries 
in recent years (Fukasaku & de Mello, 1999; Manor, 1999; World Bank, 1999; Shah, 1998; 
Crook and Manor, 1998). As a consequence of much dissatisfaction with the results of 
centralised economic planning, reformers have turned to decentralisation to break the grip of 
central government and induce broader participation in democratic governance (Olowu, 2000; 
Smoke, 1994; Wunsch & Olowu, 1990). Being closer to the people, it is assumed, local 
authorities can more easily identify people’s needs, and thus supply the appropriate form and 
level of public services (Enemuo, 2000; Rondinelli et al., 1989; Oates, 1972). In turn, it is 
argued, communities are likely to be willing to pay local taxes when the amounts they 
contribute can be related more directly to the services received (Livingstone & Charlton, 
1998; Westergaard & Alam, 1995). A commitment to decentralisation has also become an 
important element of donor supported anti-corruption strategies, due to expected 
improvements in the accountability of the state and reduced discretion available to 
bureaucrats (World Bank 2000). 
 
Decentralisation refers to administrative changes which give lower levels of government 
greater administrative authority in delivering services (Khan, 2002). Devolution involves, in 
addition, changes in political institutions, so that electors vote for representatives at lower 
levels of government who in turn have effective control over lower level bureaucrats involved 
in service delivery. The electorate are the consumers of government services, and are 
supposed to elect and put pressure on politicians to translate their demands and requirements 
for services into policy. Politicians, in turn, are supposed to monitor and control the 
bureaucrats to ensure service delivery. The role of government in this perspective is to deliver 
the services that the public, collectively and democratically, want.  
 
If the state is primarily there to deliver services for people, decentralisation, and in particular 
devolution, will, arguably, improve accountability and governance by bringing government 
closer to the people. This will make it easier for the latter to monitor and discipline the state. 
Hence, it is assumed that service delivery will improve and corruption will decline. 
Nevertheless, both the approach and the results of decentralisation have varied widely 
between countries (Smoke & Lewis, 1996). Thus, Oates (1998) argues that the case for 
decentralisation has often been made in a very general and uncritical way with little 
systematic empirical support. In recent years, these observations have led reformers and 
researchers to question how sensible decentralisation strategies are for the real situations in 
which they are applied in developing countries. For instance, to what extent – and under what 
conditions – can we expect that increased local autonomy will improve the efficiency and 
responsiveness of the public sector? How effective are the processes of decentralisation and 
devolution in communicating the real interests of the citizens? To what extent are these 
processes controlled by privileged groups within local communities? Under what conditions is 
it expected that local politicians will be more likely to be able to control local government 
bureaucrats in the public interest, and less likely to direct them or collude with them to benefit 
sectional interests, compared to national politicians and higher level bureaucrats? Are local 
officials, through sheer proximity, more accountable for their performance? Is corruption 
lower and welfare (i.e., service delivery) higher in poor countries that have devolved and 
decentralised their political and administrative systems?  
 
The purpose of this study is to assess the ‘state-of-the-art’ in the international literature on 
decentralisation and corruption. The main objectives of the study are to organise current 
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knowledge on decentralisation and corruption, discuss the major controversies within and 
across disciplines and to identify some areas in most need of further research, with an 
emphasis on questions relevant to development policy. Thus, the study is organised as a 
literature review, extracting and commenting on the core elements of and major areas covered 
by these studies in anthropology, economics, law, and political science.  
 
The report is organised as follows: A quantitative assessment of the literature on 
decentralisation and corruption is given in section 2. Section 3 provides a qualitative 
assessment, which distinguishes between the findings of the theoretical and empirical 
literature, respectively. Finally, section 4 concludes by identifying some immediate needs for 
policy relevant research. Appendix 1 provides an annotated bibliography of the core literature 
reviewed, including the findings of the individual studies and the theory/methodology applied. 
2 Quantitative assessment of the literature 
Ten years ago research on corruption was a small field. Currently, however, a large number of 
articles and reports are published every month. This development partly reflects an increased 
public concern with the problem. Furthermore, at least in the case of economics and political 
science, it reflects internal changes in the analytical approaches and tools of the disciplines, 
combined with access to new data that has made corruption a researchable topic. As a result, 
it has also made it easier to carry out a ‘survey on corruption research’. On the other hand, it 
has become a more demanding task because of the sheer bulk of readings proliferating in all 
kinds of thematic and intellectual directions.  
 
However, while the literature on corruption has boomed, relatively few studies have been 
carried out that explicitly focus on the linkages between decentralisation and corruption. For 
instance, a search in Econlit, one of the most comprehensive databases of indexed 
publications, came up with only 20 references to decentralisation and corruption for the 
period 1991 - June 2003. ISI Web of Knowledge, which is the major multidisciplinary 
database of bibliographic information gathered from thousands of scholarly journals, came up 
with 10 hits on ‘decentralization and corruption’ and 6 hits on ‘decentralisation and 
corruption’ for the period 1955 - 2003. However, few of these references dealt with linkages 
between decentralisation and corruption in developing countries (2 and 1 reference, 
respectively). A search in the JOLIS Library Catalogue of the World Bank and the IMF 
identified 16 publications under the keywords ‘decentralization and corruption’, of which 
several hits did not deal explicitly with corrup tion. Moreover, ELDIS, a base specialising in 
development information, came up with only 10 hits on ‘decentralization and corruption’ and 
7 hits on ‘decentralisation and corruption’. Several of these studies focused only on 
decentralisation and others only on corruption, not on the combined issue.  
 
The picture above, with relatively few scholarly publications having explicitly studied 
linkages between decentralisation and corruption, is reflected in the widely used volume 
Political Corruption. A handbook edited by Heidenheimer et al. (1997). None of the articles 
included in the book deals explicitly with decentralisation (one article focuses on village 
friendship and patronage in rural Greece in the early 1960s). The comprehensive four-edition 
volume on The politics of corruption edited by Williams et al. (2000) contains only two 
articles on corruption directly linked to local authorities: (1) The ‘Oslo’ scandal in the late 
1980s;  and (2) corruption in canal irrigation in South India in the early 1980s.  
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An extensive search in various databases, libraries, the internet etc., carried out as part of this 
study in July 2003, identified 41 publications analysing decentralisation and corruption (see 
table 1 and appendix 1). This also includes some studies of corruption where decentralisation 
is not the focus, but which includes it as an explanatory factor on the extent of corruption 
perceived in various countries (e.g., Treisman, 2000b). It should, however, be underlined that 
this review does not include consultancy reports and ‘grey publications’ in which 
decentralisation and corruption might be an issue discussed, but where policy 
recommendations are often not founded on empirically robust and knowledge-based insights. 
 
 
Table 1 Categorisation of publications on decentralisation and corruption  
 
EMPIRICAL STUDIES  Discipline Theoretical  
studies 
Reviews  
Cross- 
country 
regressions 
Econometric 
studies in 
individual 
countries 
Case 
studies 
Assessment 
of what work 
 or not 
Sum 
Economics 9  6 3 2 4 24 
Political science  1 3  1 2 7 
Social 
anthropology 
    3  3 
Law     2 1 3 
Management/ 
multidiscp. 
 1   2 1 4 
Total 9 2 9 3 10 8 41 
 
Source: Compiled by the author based on appendix 1 
 
Table 1 shows that economists have produced the largest number of publications on 
decentralisation and corruption. This applies to both theoretical and empirical research. A 
major share of the empirical research on the issue in both economics and political science is 
cross-country regression analysis. These aggregate studies naturally lend themselves to the 
study of macro-determinants and the effects of corruption (and vice versa), and exploit data 
on corruption derived from perception indices (most commonly Transparency International’s 
CPI). A few detailed case studies have been carried out in various disciplines, including 
(institutional) economics, social anthropology and law. The most influential of these are 
Robert Wade’s research on corruption in canal irrigation in South India, carried out in the 
early 1980s (Wade, 1982). These case studies contributed to the rejection of the broad 
generalisations and assumptions made in the then current literature. Moreover, Wade’s and 
other case studies listed in appendix 1 have proved to be of great merit for policy makers. 
Finally, 20% (8) of the publications listed are assessments of what does or does not work. 
Some of these studies are highly relevant and well written (e.g., Prud’homme, 1995; Tanzi, 
2000b), but to some extent they also present personal perspectives on the issue.  
3 Qualitative assessment of the literature 
This section provides a brief review of published research on decentralisation and corruption. 
The assessment of the literature starts out with a review of the theoretical literature, followed 
by a discussion of empirical research and findings. Reflections on the policy relevance of the 
reviewed literature conclude the section.   
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3.1 Theoretical studies and reviews 
3.1.1 Impacts of decentralisation on corruption  
In recent years, several theoretical models have been developed to explore the question of 
whether decentralisation will lead to more or less corruption. Although this literature has 
contributed to highlighting some of the important variables, the theoretical studies point in 
different directions and provide no clear-cut conclusions on the linkages between 
decentralisation and corruption. For instance, according to Breton (1996), competition 
between levels of government will lead to less corrup tion related to the provision of public 
services for which officials can demand kickbacks. This view is supported by Weingast 
(1995), who argues that a federal state structure contributes to more honest and efficient 
government by providing for competition between sub-jurisdictions. In an influential 
theoretical paper, Shleifer & Vishny (1993) suggest that states with a very centralised 
institutional structure and those with a very decentralised one may suffer less from the 
damaging effects of corruption than states with an intermediate level of institutional cen-
tralisation.  
 
By contrast, some researchers argue that ‘decentralised political systems are more corruptible, 
because the potential corrupter needs to influence only a segment of the government, and 
because in a fragmented system there are fewer centralised forces and agencies to enforce 
honesty’ (Banfield, 1979: 98). James Manor (1999:101), in his book The political economy of 
democratic decentralization, argues that decentralisation ‘is always attended by an increase in 
the number of persons who are involved in corrupt acts’, although this need not imply that the 
overall amount of money diverted by corrupt means increases. Some economists have also 
suggested that corruption may be greater at the local level. Prud’homme (1995: 211), for 
instance, argues that there are probably more opportunities for corruption at the local level. 
Firstly, local officials usually have more discretionary powers than national decision-makers. 
Secondly, local bureaucrats and politicians are likely to be more subject to pressing demands 
from local interest groups in matters such as taxation. Tanzi (2000a) supports these views.  
 
This view is also supported by recent theoretical work, founded in incentive (principal-agent) 
theory, which explores the impacts of decentralisation on corruption levels. Carbonera (2000) 
argues, for instance, that more decentralisation has a ‘positive’ impact on corruption, raising 
the individual’s propensity to accept bribes. It has also, according to her model, a twofold 
effect on incentives to monitor corrupt activities by higher levels. Firstly, it causes a loss in 
control, reducing the higher levels’ willingness to monitor. Secondly, it also increases the 
bribe paid to lower levels, enhancing their propensity to corruption and raising higher levels’ 
monitoring.  
3.1.2 Capture of local governments 
Mismanagement of resources and corruption are two acute and well-documented problems 
facing the delivery of public services in developing countries. Many studies have attributed 
this to an important incentive problem within the centralised bureaucracies that have 
traditionally been entrusted with delivery: namely, the limited ability of governments to 
monitor local cost, needs or delivery levels, and the resulting lack of accountability of 
bureaucrats. In a series of theoretical papers Bardhan & Mookherjee (1998, 1999, 2000, 2002) 
argue that decentralisation is also prone to a number of potential pitfalls.  
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The presence of corruption leads to at least three important problems: targeting within and 
between communities (or local jurisdictions) and cost effectiveness. Bardhan & Mookhejee 
focus on two different kinds of public programme designed to highlight the nature of the 
issues involved. First, they consider a purely redistributive poverty alleviation programme. 
Here, the decentralised mechanism achieves better cost effectiveness. But it may be prone to 
greater targeting weaknesses, owing to the possibility of capture of local administrative 
machinery by the elite. However, in the presence of capture of local governments, there is a 
tendency for services to be overprovided to local elites at the expense of non-elites. The 
extent of such inefficient and inequitable cross-subsidisation depends on the extent of local 
capture and on the degree of fiscal autonomy of local governments.  
 
Another kind of programme is the delivery of a private service whose production is subject to 
large fixed costs, such as irrigation services in rural areas. Here, the problem with central 
bureaucrats is that they charge bribes for delivering the service, and end up behaving like 
unregulated private monopolists. Expenditure decentralisation, on the other hand, is subject to 
a variety of alternative problems: (i) local capture by elites; (ii) local financing constraints; 
(iii) inter-jurisdictional conflict; and (iv) lack of adequate cost information or bargaining 
power of local government officials vis-à-vis service suppliers. Bardhan & Mookherjee show 
that any one of these problems can be severe enough to render the decentralised system 
inferior to the centralised. Hence, successful decentralisation initiatives need to be 
accompanied by appropriate institutions of local democracy and fiscal authority, and the 
allocation of authority to local government officials vis-à-vis other governments and service 
suppliers. 
 
The comparison between centralisation and decentralisation is shown to depend on the 
relative vulnerability of national and local governments to capture by special interest groups, 
in addition to the characteristics of the service in question. Bardan’s & Mookherjee’s major 
conclusion is that there is no a priori, unqualified verdict in favour of the decentralised 
system. Its success depends crucially upon the existence of an appropriate set of political and 
economic institutions. Moreover, they argue, decentralisation initiatives are more likely to 
succeed when accompanied by reforms that increase the scope of local democracy and reduce 
asset inequality.  
3.1.3 Fiscal decentralisation and corruption 
Fiscal decentralisation is partly justified by appeal to the classic argument of Tiebout (1956), 
who claimed that decentralised provision of public goods allows better fulfilment of diverse 
individual demands. Many observers, however, have expressed concern that the conditions 
justifying Tiebout's argument are not present in many developing countries. Brueckner (2000) 
analyses the consequences of altering Tiebout's model to include local corruption and tax 
evasion, which may exist in many developing countries. The theoretical model shows that 
these forces limit the benefits of fiscal decentralisation. By raising public-good costs, 
corruption cancels out some of the gains from better demand fulfilment, which arise as 
Tiebout sorting generates homogeneous local jurisdictions. By creating incentives for mixing 
and thereby preventing the formation of homogeneous communities, tax evasion may block 
the operation of the Tiebout mechanism. Hence, the gains from fiscal decentralisation are 
eliminated.  
 
Bardhan & Mookherjee (2002) consider three different financing mechanisms for local 
authorities: (1) local taxes; (2) user fees; and (3) central government grants. With local tax 
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financing, they argue, there is a risk that the captured local government may resort to a 
regressive financing pattern, whereby the non-elite bear the tax burden of providing services 
to the elite (see section 3.1.2). Hence, restrictions on the ability of local governments to levy 
taxes may be desirable, even at the expense of reducing the flexibility of service provision for 
local needs. User charges, they argue, may be a useful compromise between the need for 
matching provision to local needs and avoiding an unduly heavy burden on the local poor. But 
user charges are, in general, inappropriate for financing anti-poverty programmes such as the 
targeted public distribution of food, education or health services. Such programmes are, by 
their very nature, targeted at groups that do not have the ability to pay for the service – or to 
pay the bribes to the bureaucrats. As far as central government grants are concerned, these 
may encourage local governments to claim higher local need or cost, leading to a restriction 
of the level of service delivery.  
3.2 Empirical studies 
3.2.1 Impacts of decentralisation on corruption  
Empirical studies of the linkages between corruption and decentralisation in developing 
countries are relatively few. The existing literature can be categorised into (i) cross-country 
regression analyses, and (ii) case studies founded in economics, law, political science and 
social anthropology.  
 
(i) Cross-country regression analyses 
This literature has two features in common: (a) it exploits data on corruption derived from 
perception indices; and (b) it explains corruption as a function of countries’ policy-
institutional environment. These features are interlinked (see Reinikka & Svensson, 2002a: 2). 
Moreover, the use of cross-country data lends itself to the study of macro-determinants and 
the effects of corruption. Given the problems of collecting quantitative data on corruption, the 
use of perception data makes it feasible to study a large cross-section of countries. Some 
major contributions to this literature are reviewed below.  
 
Treisman (2000b), using Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI) as 
the main dependent variable in the regressions, finds that federal states are more corrupt than 
unitary ones. In a follow-up study, Treisman (2000a) finds that states which have more tiers 
of government tend to have higher perceived corruption, and may also do a worse job of 
providing public services. He attributes this to the collective action problem for semi-
autonomous central and sub-national officials in decid ing how much to extract in bribes from 
businesses that both levels have the power to regulate (ibid. 440): ‘Restraints by one [state] 
level merely increase the pickings of the other’. According to Treisman (p. 441), the likely 
result is sub-optimally high demands for bribes, which end up driving many private actors out 
of the market. In other words, competition between autonomous levels of government to 
extract bribes leads to ‘overgrazing’ of the commons. In contrast, in unitary states more 
effective hierarchies of control enable central officials to limit the extraction of sub-national 
officials to more ‘reasonable’ levels.  
 
These results are supported by Goldsmith (1999). In a regression analysis which is also based 
on corruption perception indices, he suggests that federal or decentralised systems are not 
favourable settings because they make it easier to hide corrupt practices (or intimidate 
whistleblowers). Hence, the Tieboutian idea that decreasing the size of government units will 
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strengthen competition between governments for capital, and thus stimulating greater 
efficiency and honesty, is not supported. Countries with smaller first-tier jurisdictions tend to 
be perceived as more corrupt. If these interpretations are correct, caution must be raised in 
decentralising political power in poor countries that are susceptible to corruption.  
 
By contrast, other studies provide quite the opposite conclusions. For instance, Estache & 
Sinha (1995), in cross-country regressions covering 20 countries with data for the period 
1970-92, find a significantly positive effect of expenditure decentralisation on per capita 
infrastructure deliveries. The effect is stronger in developing countries compared to developed 
countries, and weaker when local governments rely more on central funds than on their own 
revenues. Gurgur & Shah (2000) find that decentralisation supports greater accountability in 
the public sector and reduced corruption. They also find that decentralisation has a greater 
negative impact on corruption in unitary countries than in federal states. For a non- industrial 
sample, they argue that drivers of corruption are a lack of service orientation in the public 
sector, weak democratic institutions and a closed economy.  
 
(ii) Case studies 
Several case studies discuss corruption at the local government level in various countries. Due 
to the limited number of studies which deal explicitly with this issue, this review also includes 
some cases from Western countries. Not surprisingly, this literature deals with many issues 
and points in many directions.  
 
A ‘classical’ reference in the literature on corruption is James Wilson’s (1966) article 
‘Corruption: the shame of the states’, which refers to the United States. Wilson argues that 
one cause of the corruption in the US system is the need to exchange favours to overcome 
decentralised authority. In a more recent study, Mana (1999) examines the causes and 
characteristics of corruption at the provincial level in Papua New Guinea. It is argued that the 
1995 decentralisation reforms only resulted in increased discretion among provincial 
governors (‘grand corruption’) as well as increased competition among NGOs, leading to 
enhanced pressure for corrupt practices (‘petty corruption’). In response, the author pleads for 
an integrated approach, including an independent anti-corruption commission at the provincial 
level, combined with education and training of local officers. Contrary to the studies referred 
to above, Robert Wade (1997) finds that the over-centralised top-down structure of the system 
in India is largely responsible for corruption in the irrigation bureaucracy. In contrast, stronger 
communication and monitoring mechanisms in Korea may explain the better delivery 
performance relative to India. 
 
Several case studies focus on the impacts of decentralisation reforms on corruption. Lydia 
Segal’s detailed studies of the public schooling system in New York provide useful insights 
on how politically decentralised programmes are vulnerable to corruption. Segal (1997) 
identifies and analyses the structural features of decentralisation that invite, facilitate, and 
even ‘necessitate’ wrongdoing through a case study of the New York City public school 
system, where programme vulnerabilities have led to widespread, systemic corruption. She 
also makes detailed recommendations for ways to lessen these problems through institutional 
changes designed to curb corruption opportunities and reforms to strengthen deterrence 
without increasing burdensome rules and regulations. In a follow-up study, Segal (1999) 
discusses the recent trend of re-centralisation in the New York City public school system. She 
first analyses the justifications given for decentralisation and examines the corruption and 
poor school performance that resulted from the new system. She argues that while re-
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centralisation efforts have attempted to combat these problems, the revamped system has also 
introduced the potential for new forms of corruption. 
 
Some social anthropologists have explored why decentralisation reforms may not achieve the 
expected results of improved transparency and accountability. These studies focus often on 
social obligations and patronage as the dominant variables in the individual’s ‘survival’ 
strategies and decision making. In a case study in a Greek community from the early 1960s, 
Campbell (1997) finds that a dominant feature of the social system is the isolation of the 
family and its struggle against other families, whether in terms of the possibility of bare 
subsistence or of social prestige. Social obligations are particular to the individual’s family, 
and these stand in direct conflict to the weaker and more general responsibilities of good 
neighbourliness. The notion of service to the community exists and is honoured. But the 
service takes a form which honours the individual, his family and the community in equal 
degree as, for instance, in the foundation of a church or a school. Without family and friends a 
man loses all power, influence and social prestige.  
 
More recently, Ruud (2000) has explored similar issues in an Indian community. He argues 
that the networking that people indulge in as part of their survival strategies is not only 
culturally acceptable and saturated with cultural meaning as well as good common sense, it is 
also a social practice with its own particular rules, winners and losers. To be able to ‘play the 
game’, to ‘make a deal’, and to ‘manage’, involves having many and important contacts. The 
more dexterous are the more successful. But people generally dedicate much time and effort 
into maintaining vast networks as part of their coping strategies. Such networks of contacts 
and friendships are based on reciprocity – immediate or delayed, of the same kind or entirely 
different. These networks can be mobilised when need arises. At the outer ends, however, the 
'contact' bond is thin, and reciprocity becomes more immediate and more material. According 
to Ruud, the state in India cannot be insulated from 'corruption' partly because of its limited 
resources and personnel. However, more important is the state’s insufficient command over 
bureaucrats, politicians and voters due to practices that are culturally significant and 
embedded in the conduct of daily life. 
 
Bierschenk & Olivier de Sardan (1997) demonstrate the extreme complexity and fluidity of 
local politics in Africa, characterised by a large number of institutions of decision making 
(traditional, non-traditional, formal and informal). In a case study of five villages in the 
Central African Republic, they show that local arenas of power are relatively independent of 
the state. However, due to decentralised development co-operation, they have direct 
connections with the international system. They argue that a change of regime at the national 
level creates additional instances at the local level and opens the political arenas to new actors 
who take up positions beside those already in place without displacing the former.  
Decentralisation reforms involve not only a redefinition of the relations between central and 
local powers, but also raises the question of the local presence of a state which in many 
African countries is currently remarkable in its absence (ibid. 468). However, the absence of 
the state does not mean that a void exists in its place. Local life may suffer from under-
administration, but still be characterised by latent and disguised greed, conflict and 
negotiation between various authorities, clans and factions. Thus, ‘the current processes of 
decentralisation in Africa, far from being the radical rift opening the way to good governance, 
are just another one in a long series of regime changes decided upon at the top of the State, 
experienced in Africa since the end of the second World War’ (ibid.). The authors expect that, 
in conformity to the dominant modes of functioning of local political arenas, decentralisation 
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reforms will be subjected to the same ‘grinding down’ in local arenas as other forms of state 
intervention before.  
3.2.2 Capture of local governments 
Based on analytical models, Bardhan & Mookherjee (1999, 2000, 2002) argue that political 
accountability in poor countries is particularly affected by the likelihood of corruption or 
capture by interest groups (see section 3.1.2). While local governments may have better local 
information and accountability pressure, they may be more vulnerable to capture by local 
elites, who will then receive a disproportionate share of spending on public goods (Bardhan, 
2002:192). The problem for the central government is that it has very little information on 
local needs, delivery costs and the amount actually delivered. Hence, in theory we may expect 
that many developing countries experience large gaps between a commitment of resources at 
the central level and the delivery of services at the local level.  
 
Reinikka & Svensson (2002b) provide one of the few detailed empirical studies on this issue. 
They study the leakage of educational funds from the central government to schools in 
Uganda. The survey data reveal that during the period 1991-95, the primary schools on 
average received only 13% of the grants from the central government. Most schools received 
nothing. The bulk of the school grant was captured by local officials and politicians, either for 
private gain or for use for purposes other than education. The data also reveals considerable 
variations in grants received across schools, suggesting that rather than being passive 
recipients of flows from the government, schools may use their bargaining power to secure 
greater shares of funding. Three variables were found to be important in explaining the 
variation in capture across schools: (a) school size; (b) income; and (c) the extent to which 
teachers are qualified. Moreover, well-performing schools seem to attract visitors from the 
centre, and were, accordingly, ‘rewarded’ by local officials by receiving more capitation 
grants. 
3.2.3 Fiscal decentralisation and corruption 
Research on fiscal decentralisation includes both cross-country regressions and case-studies 
of local authorities in both developed (e.g., the USA) and developing countries (e.g., 
Tanzania).  
 
de Mello & Barenstein (2001), based on cross-country data for up to 78 countries, show that 
fiscal decentralisation - the assignment of expenditure and revenue mobilisation functions to 
sub-national levels of government - is associated with various indicators of governance, such 
as corruption, rule of law, and government effectiveness. Unlike previous studies in the 
decentralisation/governance literature, which focus primarily on expenditure-based measures 
of decentralisation, the results reported in this paper show that the relationship between 
decentralisation and governance depends on how sub-national expenditures are financed. The 
higher the share in total sub-national revenues of non-tax revenues and grants and transfers 
from higher levels of government, the stronger the association between decentralisation and 
governance. These findings are supported by de Mello (2000) who suggests that fiscal 
decentralisation can boost social capital and, hence, bring the government closer to the 
people.  
 
The theoretical literature has emphasized that expenditure decentralisation will only be 
effective if accompanied by the devolution of revenue generation to local governments. 
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Fisman & Gatti (2000b) examine this hypothesis empirically by studying the mismatch 
between revenue generation and expenditure in U.S. states. They find that larger federal 
transfers are associated with higher rates of conviction for abuse of public office, which 
supports the theory that soft-budget constraints created by federal transfers are potentially 
problematic. In cross-country regressions covering 57 count ries with data referring to the 
period 1980-95, Fisman & Gatti (2002a) suggest that fiscal decentralisation in government 
expenditure is strongly and significantly associated with lower corruption. This result is 
supported by Gulsun Arikan (2000), who examines the effect of fiscal decentralisation on the 
level of corruption. It is theoretically shown that increased decentralisation causes more 
competition for capital among jurisdictions, resulting in a lower level of corruption. This 
result is tested using cross-country data. The regressions confirm the hypothesised 
relationship, but are sensitive to the choice of the explanatory variables.   
 
Fjeldstad (2001) studies the relations between local bureaucrats, politicians and donors in 
local government revenue  enhancement in Tanzania. Fiscal administrations in many local 
authorities are found to be highly corrupt, partly due to the extreme degree of discretionary 
fiscal power held by local officials, and poor (or non-existent) monitoring from above. The 
article also shows that coercion is likely to be an integral part of the effort to raise local 
government taxes. Furthermore, the study demonstrates that the involvement of donors 
through arrangements which supply development aid on the basis of matching funds from the 
local government may induce increased tax effort, but at the expense of accountability, 
responsibility and democratic development. Increased tax effort is achieved through coercive 
methods, often characterised by violent and extortive forms of enforcement. It is argued that 
coercive tax collection has important consequences for citizens’ rights and for the 
democratisation process. If taxpayers’ rights are unclear for both taxpayers and tax 
authorities, tax compliance and accountability will be affected. Moreover, as long as coercion 
is accepted as an integral part of tax collection it is unlikely that state-society relations can 
become more accountable and democratic. 
3.2.4 What works and what does not 
The recommendations in the literature on ‘best practice’ point in different directions. 
Moreover, some of the authors simply present personal perspectives on what works, or the 
perspectives of the institutions they represent, and not recommendations that are knowledge 
based and empirically tested.  
 
Gonzales de Asis (2000) suggests a conceptual framework to resolve corruption incentives, 
drawing on the ‘governance’ vision of the World Bank. Three main causes of corruption in 
the public sphere are addressed: (1) institutional incentives (e.g., discretion, complex 
procedures, patronage, low public wages); (2) lack of public information and transparency; 
and (3) a lack of accountability of public officials. The separation between these categories 
remains, however, unclear in the paper. Local level strategies to address these ‘pervasive 
institutional incentives’ should include: (a) raising political will (presented as a necessary 
condition for the other elements to work); (b) diagnostic tools and training workshops; and (c) 
participatory diagnostics to arrive at broadly supported solutions. Although municipal policy-
makers might find such best-practice examples useful, a critical evaluation of the local 
conditions under which the recommended tools actually work is lacking. The impacts of local 
power relations, elite capturing, social obligations etc. are ignored.  
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Such issues are to some extent dealt by Jenkins & Goetz (1999), who describe the work of a 
small activist group in the north Indian state of Rajasthan. The group has waged a campaign 
to secure the right of ordinary people to gain access to information held by government 
officials. In the process of experimenting with methods of compiling, sharing and verifying 
expenditure data at very local levels, and in the absence of a statutory entitlement to such 
information, the right-to- information movement in India has developed a radical interpretation 
of the notion that citizens have a right both to know how they are governed and to participate 
actively in the process of auditing their representatives. The article examines the process by 
which this campaign emerged and the means by which it pursues its goals. It then analyses the 
implications of this experience, and the larger movement it has spawned, for debates in three 
areas: human rights, participatory development and anti-corruption action.  
 
Tanzi (2000b) reviews the experiences with fiscal decentralisation of the IMF’s Fiscal Affairs 
Department. The paper discusses some issues of relevance to the decision to decentralise or 
not or to the likelihood that decentralisation will produce useful results. Tanzi suggests that 
decentralisation is more likely to be successful if some conditions are met before the process 
of decentralisation starts. In particular, he argues that decentralisation can be a good policy if 
institutions related to tax policy, tax administration, and expenditure management systems and 
budgets work. Especially important are institutions that allow the central government to 
transfer resources to local governments with some assurance that the resources will be issued 
effectively and for the purpose for which they are passed on. These conditions for successful 
decentralisation are, however, often not in place. Thus, he argues, casual observations indicate 
that corruption is more widespread at the local than at the national level.  
 
Although Tanzi’s lines of argument are intuitively appealing, one problem with his approach 
is that it generalises from observations from countries and institutions that are very different 
with respect to history, level of economic development, economic structure, political 
traditions etc. Langseth (1995), in contrast, provides a country-specific study of the Civil 
Service Reform Programme (CSRP) in Uganda. It outlines the context in which the CSRP is 
being implemented and establishes the link between the CSRP and other reform programmes, 
particularly constitutional decentralisation, liberalisation/privatisation and army 
demobilisation. It also analyses the progress made so far, given certain obstacles, and attempts 
to assess and make suggestions for the road ahead. 
 
In recent years, several ‘toolkits’ for anti-corruption efforts have been developed. Some of 
these are very general and only applicable under very specific conditions. Others, however, 
provide useful case-based suggestions. For instance, Klitgaard et al. (2000) demonstrate ways 
of eliminating the problem of urban corruption. Based on case studies from New York, Hong 
Kong and La Paz, the authors set forth strategies for (1) diagnosing municipal corruption; (2) 
involving citizens and government employees in discovering and implementing solutions that 
the authors contend have proven workable and effective; (3) attacking corruption from an 
economic approach, regarding it as a crime of calculation and as a function of corrupt systems 
rather than merely corrupt individuals; (4) eliminating and preventing corruption by adapting 
specified methods; and (5) avoiding pitfalls common to many reform efforts.  
3.3 The policy relevance of the reviewed literature 
With respect to decentralisation reforms, we know at present more about what has not worked 
in the past than what is likely to work in the future. There are many cases of obvious failure, 
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but few cases of obvious success. However, mistakes of the past provide indications of 
promising paths for future efforts. 
 
The theoretical literature on decentralisation and corruption points in different directions and 
provides no clear-cut conclusions. Among the most promising theoretical contributions is the 
work of Bardhan & Mookherjee (1999, 2000, 2002) on capture and governance at local and 
national levels (see section 3.1.2). This research has contributed to shedding light on the 
potential danger of decentralisation reforms being captured by local elites. However, the 
question of whether or not decentralising public bureaucracies will reduce corruption remains 
open. At best, the research says that the impacts of decentralisation on corruption are multi-
dimensional and depend on the interactions between a variety of actors.  
 
Although the theoretical literature reviewed specifies a large number of conditions when 
decentralisation will limit and when it will further corruption, it tends to be too abstract to 
help in understanding how such complex relationships emerge and, thus, can be addressed. 
Moreover, the literature often tends to assume the existence of such direct linkages rather than 
investigating their extent and limits in practice. For the question of these linkages is basically 
an empirical one.  
 
The policy relevance of some of the existing empirical literature on decentralisation and 
corruption is also questionable. As discussed above (section 3.2.1), the policy implications of 
the cross-country regression studies are somewhat discouraging. Decentralisation polices may 
– at least in the short run – lead to increased corruption. For policy lessons, however, caution 
must be exercised when referring to these studies. This is partly due to data inadequacies and 
how to deal with the problem of endogeneity of some of the explanatory variables. Moreover, 
the use of corruption perception indices in the cross-country regressions raises concern about 
perception biases. Furthermore, due to the aggregate nature of the data these studies tell us 
little about the relationship between corruption and individual agents (Reinikka & Svensson, 
2002a). Finally, the macro determinants cannot satisfactory explain the within-country 
variations in corruption.  
 
It might also be argued that case studies have limited merit. However, in the empirical 
literature on corruption among the most important contributions are Robert Wade’s case 
studies of corruption in canal irrigation in South India (see Wade, 1982, 1997). Moreover, 
case studies may contribute to a rejection of broad generalisations and assumptions made in 
the literature. Detailed case studies can also be of great merit for policy makers. In particular, 
it might be illuminating to carry out case-based comparative studies across countries. 
4 Issues for further research 
As reflected in this review, research that explicitly focuses on the linkages between 
decentralisation and corruption is limited. In particular, there is lack of empirical studies on 
ongoing reform processes that may contribute to informing reformers on the strengths and 
weaknesses of the chosen approaches.  
 
Anecdotal evidence indicates that corruption in local authorities is particularly prevalent in 
procurement of goods and services, in revenue collection and financial management, in 
human resources management, and in land allocation and control (e.g., ESRF & FACEIT, 
2002; RoU, 2002). Hence, these areas should be given particular attention. Moreover, little is 
known about the impacts on new public management inspired reforms which may include 
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privatisation of public services provision and outsourcing of revenue collection. What kind of 
activities lend themselves to privatisation and what kind lend themselves to local authorities?  
 
Finding appropriate revenue sources and enforcement methods for local governments are 
among the most urgent and challenging tasks for decentralisation processes in many poor 
countries (Brosio, 2000: 29). But while there is some clarity regarding what type of 
improvements are desired, there is considerably less understanding on how to make this 
happen. For instance, while the system of grants from the central government has been 
improved in recent years in several countries, fiscal responsibility is still weak. Why? The 
risks of local misuse of funds or corruption are evident as more funds and more powers are 
devolved to a new, untrained local leadership and a local administration with limited capacity 
for financial management. If more funds are channelled to local governments through sector 
support programmes, the risks of ‘decentralising corruption’ are of course latent. Even though 
funds misappropriated could be insignificant compared with the far larger misuse at the 
central government level, examples of an account overdraft or an outright theft from the 
coffers of a local government are often much more visible to the general public than a 
complicated kick-back or fraud at the ministerial level, and may thus contribute to 
undermining the trustworthiness and legitimacy of local authorities. It can also easily be 
utilised in public debate to erode the decentralisation reforms.  
 
Another area which has received little attention is the possible relationship between the degree 
of decentralisation and the number of regulations in a country. Such research would indicate 
what happens when a country multiplies additional governmental levels. What happens if 
each level pursues its own objectives, not just through taxes and public spending, but also 
through regulations? Direct observations indicate that the more constrained are the authorities 
in raising revenue and in spending, the more likely is it that they will try to rely on regulations 
to pursue their objective (see Tanzi, 2000b). Accordingly, what is the link between the level 
and arbitrariness of local taxes and regulations, the resulting corruption and bribery, and the 
evolution of the shadow economy?  
 
The extent of relative ‘capture’ of governments at different levels by elites is crucial in 
understanding the likely impact of decentralisation reforms (Bardhan, 2002:194). However, 
very little theoretical and empirical research has been done on this subject. Among the 
theoretical work is the research by Bardhan & Mookherjee (1999, 2000, 2002), while 
Reinikka & Svensson (2002b), focusing on grants to primary schools in Uganda, provide one 
of the few detailed and well-researched empirical studies.  
 
The extent of capture of local governments by local elites depends on factors such as the level 
of social and economic inequality within communities, political participation and voter 
awareness, fairness and regularity of elections, transparency in local decision making 
processes and local government accounts, and media attention (Bardhan, 2002:194). These 
factors vary widely across communities and countries (see Crook & Manor, 1998; Conning & 
Kevane, 2001). Certainly, central governments are also subject to capture and sometimes even 
to a greater extent than the local government level. But at the local level in situations with 
high inequality, collusion may be easier to organise and enforce in small proximate groups 
involving officials, contractors and interest groups. Moreover, the risk of being detected and 
reported can be assumed to be easier to manage due to the intermingled social and economic 
relationships among local influential people. Hence, when the potential for capture of local 
governments is serious, decentralisation programmes ought to focus a great deal of attention 
on strengthening local accountability mechanisms. A key question for research is therefore: 
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What are the necessary conditions for reducing/minimising local government capture by local 
elites? Relevant factors to explore might be the level of citizens’ political awareness (e.g., 
organised by CBOs, regular local elections, institutionalised public hearings on items of 
public expenditure, literacy level etc.).   
 
Recent research on decentralisation and corruption often underscores the importance of 
formal institutions in consolidating democracy and good governance. It is argued that well-
functioning legal, administrative and political institutions are necessary requirements for 
successful local government reforms. However, research on corruption in poor countries 
should also look beyond the formal structures of the local government to the informal 
networks of patronage and social domination that often determine how political power is 
actually wielded in the communities. The concrete interlinkages between state institutions and 
society ought to be probed to explore the multiple ways in which they influence and shape 
each other through detailed case studies. Weight should also be given to the legacy of 
historical antecedents, including the legacy of colonialism. Moreover, in many aid-dependent 
African countries donors often exert strong influence on the behaviour, decisions and actions of 
local authority administrators and politicians. Generally, donors co-operate with council 
administrators and staff to implement their activities, often through the creation of parallel 
structures. Relevant questions for research are: To what extent do such donor interventions 
change the relative bargaining power between the local bureaucracy and the elected 
councillors? And what are the impacts on accountability and democratic consolidation in local 
authorities?  
 
Although institutions may have traditional and patrimonial functions in addition to their 
formal roles, citizens do relate to and are dependent on the formal institutions (electoral 
arrangements, party systems, legal orders, revenue administrations and other administrative 
procedures) for gaining their full and basic political and civil rights. In particular, when it 
comes to democratic consolidation, there is a question of the spread of democratic norms, of 
political crafting, and the design of political institutions. Thus, research on decentralisation 
and corruption should focus on both informal and formal institutions.  
 
Country-specific knowledge and thematic knowledge on corruption ought to be combined. For 
instance, studies of particular countries that have managed to contain problems of systemic 
corruption in local authorities, or specific institutions designed to fight corruption directly, 
may offer insights that are potentially replicable in other situations, and also clarify the extent 
to which the experiences of one country or institution are transferable to others. For instance, 
political decentralisation is seen as a source of corruption in Russia but not in China 
(Blanchard & Shleifer, 2000). Why? Such research may also produce evidence on the 
limitations of ‘universal’ approaches to local government reforms and general anti-corruption 
prescriptions.  
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Banfield. E.C. 1979 ‘Corruption as a feature of governmental 
organization’ in M. Ekpo, (ed.) Bureaucratic 
Corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa: Towards a 
Search for Causes and Consequences. 
Washington D.C.: University Press of America 
Political 
science/Public 
administration 
 Banfield argues that ‘decentralised political 
systems are more corruptible, because the 
potential corrupter needs to influence only a 
segment of the government, and because in a 
fragmented system there are fewer centralised 
forces and agencies to enforce honesty’ 
 
Bardhan, P. & 
Mookherjee, D.  
1998 ‘Expenditure decentralization and the delivery 
of public services in developing countries.’ 
Department of Economics, University of 
Berkeley (mimeo). 
Economics Theoretical model The comparison between centralisation and 
decentralisation is shown to depend on the 
relative vulnerability of national and local 
governments to capture by special interest 
groups, in addition to the characteristics of the 
service in question. Their major conclusion is 
that there exists no a priori, unqualified 
verdict in favour of the decentralised system, 
and, in particular, its success depends 
crucially upon the existence of an appropriate 
set of political and economic institutions. In 
particular, they argue, decentralisation 
initiatives are more likely to succeed when 
accompanied by reforms that increase the 
scope of local democracy and reduce asset 
inequality.  
 
Bardhan, P.  & 
Mookherjee, D. 
1999 ‘Relative capture of local and central 
governments: An essay in the political economy 
of decentralization.’ University of California, 
Berkeley, and Boston University (mimeo).  
Economics Theoretical model The relationship between decentralisation and 
the extent of rent extraction by private parties 
is ambiguous. A number of factors provide 
support to the presumption that 
decentralisation is prone to a potential pitfall 
owing to the greater vulnerability of local 
governments to capture by local elites. A 
number of other factors, however, create an 
opposite tendency for lower capture at the 
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local level. The paper concludes that empirical 
research is required to investigate the extent 
and determinants of relative capture at 
different levels of government. 
 
Bardhan, P. & 
Mookherjee, D.  
2000 ‘Capture and governance at local and national 
levels.’ American Economic Review, Vol. 90 (2), 
pp. 135-139. 
Economics Theoretical Interest groups may be more cohesive at the 
local level, leading to greater state capture and 
the substitution of private transfers for public 
services. If this theoretical argument is 
correct, countries in which a greater share of 
public business is conducted at sub-national 
levels would be more corrupt and less 
effective at providing public goods than those 
in which public services are more centralised.  
 
Bardhan, P. & 
Mookherjee, D. 
2002 ‘Corruption and decentralization of 
infrastructure in developing countries.’ Univ. of 
California, Berkeley and Boston University 
(mimeo). 
Economics Theoretical model Decentralisation tends to expand service 
delivery as control rights shift to those more 
responsive to user needs. However, in the 
presence of capture of local governments, 
there is a tendency for services to be 
overprovided to local elites, at the expense of 
non-elites. The extent of such inefficient and 
inequitable cross-subsidisation depends on the 
extent of local capture and on the degree of 
fiscal autonomy of local governments.  
 
Bierschenk, T. 
& Olivier de 
Sardan, J.-P. 
1997 ‘Local powers and a distant state in rural Central 
African Republic.’ The Journal of Modern 
African Studies, Vol. 35 (3), pp. 441-468.  
Social 
anthropology 
Case study, five 
villages in CAR, 1995. 
Decentralisation involves not only a 
redefinition of the relations between central 
and local powers, but also raises the question 
of the local presence of a state which in many 
African countries is currently remarkably 
absent. The absence of the state does not mean 
that a void exists in its place. Local life may 
suffer from under-administration, but still be 
characterised by latent and disguised greed, 
conflict and negotiation between various 
authorities, clans and factions.  
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Breton, A.  1996 Competitive governments: An economic theory 
of politics and public finance. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Economics Theoretical The authors argues that competition between 
levels of government will lead to less corrup-
tion related to the provision of public services 
for which officials can demand kickbacks. 
 
Brueckner, J.K.  2000 ‘Fiscal decentralization in developing countries: 
The effects of local corruption and tax evasion.’ 
Annals of Economics and Finance , Vol. 1 (1), 
pp. 1-18. 
Economics Theoretical  Fiscal decentralization is partly justified by 
appeal to the classic argument of Tiebout 
(1956), who claimed that decentralised 
provision of public goods allows better 
fulfilment of diverse individual demands. 
Many observers, however, have expressed 
concern that the conditions justifying 
Tiebout's argument are not present in many 
developing countries. This paper analyses the 
consequences of altering Tiebout's model to 
include local corruption and tax evasion, 
which may exist in many developing 
countries. The analysis shows that these forces 
limit the benefits from fiscal decentralisation. 
 
Campbell, J.K. 1997 ‘Village friendship and patronage.’ Chapter 20 
(pp. 327-337) in A.J. Heidenheimer, M. 
Johnston & V.T. LeVine (eds.) Political 
corruption. A handbook. New 
Brunswick/London: Transaction Publishers. 
Social 
anthropology 
Case study in a Greek 
community, early 
1960s. 
A dominant feature of the social system is the 
isolation of the family and its struggle against 
other families, whether in terms of the 
possibility of bare subsistence or of social 
prestige. The more important social 
obligations are particular to the individual’s 
family, and these stand in direct conflict with 
the weaker and more general responsibilities 
of good neighbourliness. The notion of service 
to the community exists and is honoured. But 
the service takes a form which honours the 
individual, his family and the community in 
equal degree as, for instance, in the foundation 
of a church or a school. Such services are 
never anonymous. Without friends a man 
loses all power, influence and social prestige.  
 
Carbonera, E. 2000  ‘Corruption and decentralisation.’ Working Economics Theoretical (PA theory) More decentralisation has a positive impact on 
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Paper 342/83. Dipartimento di Scienze 
Economiche, Università di Bologna. 
corruption, raising individual propensity to 
accept bribes. It has also, according to the 
model, a twofold effect on incentives to 
monitor corrupt activities by higher levels. 
Firstly, it causes a loss in control, reducing 
their willingness to monitor. Secondly, it also 
increases the bribe paid to lower levels, 
enhancing their propensity to corruption and 
raising higher levels’ monitoring.  
 
de Mello, L. 2000 ‘Can fiscal decentralization strengthen social 
capital?’ IMF Working Paper WP 2000/129. 
Washington DC: International Monetary Fund. 
Economics Cross country 
regressions; theories of 
fiscal federalism and 
social capital 
The paper does not explicitly focus on 
corruption. The regression analysis suggests 
that fiscal decentralisation can boost social 
capital and, hence, bring the government 
closer to the people. For policy lessons, 
however, caution must be exercised. This is 
partly due to data inadequacies and the 
relatively small sample of countries. 
 
de Mello, L. & 
Barenstein, M. 
2001 ‘Fiscal decentralization and governance: A 
cross-country analysis.’ International Monetary 
Fund Working Paper WP/01/171 
Economics Cross-country 
regressions, up to 78 
countries 
This paper shows that fiscal decentralization is 
associated with various indicators of 
governance, such as corruption, rule of law, 
and governmental effectiveness. Unlike 
previous studies in the 
decentralisation/governance literature, which 
focus primarily on expenditure-based 
measures of decentralisation, the results 
reported in this paper show that the 
relationship between decentralization and 
governance depends on how sub-national 
expenditures are financed. The higher the 
share in total sub-national revenues of non-tax 
revenues and grants and transfers from higher 
levels of government, the stronger the 
association between decentralisation and 
governance. 
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Estache, A. & 
Sinha, S. 
1995 ‘Does decentralization increase public 
infrastructure expenditure?’ In A. Estache (ed.) 
Decentralizing infrastructure: Advantages and 
limitations. World Bank Discussion Papers 290. 
Washington DC. 
 Cross-country 
regressions (20 
countries, period 1970-
92) 
The study finds a significant positive effect of 
expenditure decentralisation on per capita 
infrastructure deliveries. The effect is stronger 
in developing countries compared to 
developed countries, and weaker when local 
governments rely more on central funds than 
on their own revenues. 
 
Fisman, R. & 
Gatti, R. 
2002a ‘Decentralization and corruption: Evidence 
across countries.’ Journal of Public Economics, 
Vol. 83 (3), pp. 325-345 (an earlier version 
published as World Bank Policy Research 
Working Papers 2290). 
Economics Cross-country 
regressions (57 
countries, period 1980-
95) 
The study suggests that fiscal decentralisation 
in government expenditure is strongly and 
significantly associated with lower corruption. 
 
Fis man, R. & 
Gatti, R. 
2002b ‘Decentralization and corruption: Evidence from 
U.S. federal transfer programs.’ Public Choice, 
Vol. 113 (1-2), pp. 25-35. 
Economics Econometric analysis  The theoretical literature has emphasized that 
expenditure decentralisation will only be 
effective if accompanied by the devolution of 
revenue generation to local governments. This 
paper examines this hypothesis empirically, 
by studying the mismatch between revenue 
generation and expenditure in U.S. states. 
Larger federal transfers are associated with 
higher rates of conviction for abuse of public 
office, supporting the theory that soft-budget 
constraints created by federal transfers are 
potentially problematic. 
 
Fjeldstad, O-H 2001 ‘Taxation, coercion and donors. Local 
government tax enforcement in Tanzania.’ The 
Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 39 (2), 
pp. 289-306. 
 
Economics 
(NIE) 
Case study Fiscal administrations in many local 
authorities in Tanzania are found to be highly 
corrupt, partly due to the extreme degree of 
dis cretionary fiscal powers of local officials, 
and poor (or non-existent) monitoring from 
above. 
Gainsborough 
M.  
 
2003 ‘Corruption and the politics of economic 
decentralisation in Vietnam.’ 
Journal of Contemporary Asian Studies, Vol. 33 
(1), pp. 69-84.  
Political 
science 
Case study The article offers an alternative interpretation 
to what is usually reflected in the literature on 
how to understand the phenomenon of big 
corruption cases. Based on a detailed account 
of one big corruption case in Vietnam, i.e., the 
Tan Binh Production Service and Export 
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Company (Tamexco), the author argues that 
such cases are best viewed as an attempt by 
the political centre to discipline lower levels 
of the party-state against a backdrop of 
increased decentralisation. This interpretation, 
it is argued, makes sense both of the increased 
frequency with which big corruption cases 
occurred in the 1990s, and of the ferocity with 
which they have been executed. This 
interpretation also makes a more authentically 
political account insofar as the centre is no 
longer seen as simply clamping down on 
corruption ‘in the public interest’, but rather as 
representing one side in a struggle for 
influence between different levels of the state, 
where the prize is control over economic 
resources. In the Tamexco case, 
businesspeople and bankers were taken to 
court and either sentenced to death or given 
prison terms. Moreover, city and district level 
politicians were censured but not imprisoned, 
while no central-level politician was ever 
publicly implicated in the case.  
 
Goldsmith, 
A.A.  
1999 ‘Slapping the grasping hand: Correlates of 
political corruption in emerging markets.’ 
American Journal of Economics and Sociology, 
pp. 866-883. 
Political 
science 
Cross-country 
regressions (using 
Transparency 
International's index of 
perceived corruption as 
the independent 
variable). 
 
Economic liberalisation, political 
democratisation and administrative 
centralisation are associated with lower 
degrees of political corruption The author 
suggests that federal or decentralised systems 
are not favourable settings because they make 
it easier to hide corrupt practices (or 
intimidate whistleblowers). 
Gonzales de 
Asis, M. 
2000 ‘Reducing corruption at the local level.’ World 
Bank Institute . Washington DC (mimeo). 
Law Conceptual framework 
to resolve corruption 
incentives, drawing on 
the ‘governance’ vision 
of the World Bank.  
Three main causes of corruption in the public 
sphere are addressed: (1) institutional 
incentives (e.g., discretion, complex 
procedures, patronage, low public wages); (2) 
lack of public information and transparency; 
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and (3) a lack of accountability of public 
officials. The separation between these 
categories remains, however, unclear in the 
paper. But, although municipal policy-makers 
might find such best-practice examples useful, 
a critical evaluation of the local conditions 
under which the recommended tools actually 
work is lacking in the paper.  
 
Gulsun Arikan, 
G. 
2000 ‘Fiscal decentralization: A remedy for 
corruption?’ Department of Economics, 
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign 
(mimeo) 
Economics Cross-country 
regressions (85 
countries, based on TI’s 
CPI 1998) 
The paper examines the effect of fiscal 
decentralisation on the level of corruption. It 
is theoretically shown that increased 
decentralisation causes more competition for 
capital among jurisdictions, resulting in a 
lower level of corruption. This result is tested 
using cross-country data. The regressions 
confirm the hypothesised relationship, but are 
sensitive to the choice of the explanatory 
variables.   
Gurgur, T. & A. 
Shah 
2000 ‘Localization and corruption: Panacea or 
Pandora’s box?’ OED, World Bank (mimeo, 14 
October) 
Economics Brief review of the 
literature followed by a 
cross-country 
regression analysis with 
the CPI as independent 
variable. 
For a non-industrial sample, drivers of 
corruption are lack of service orientation in 
the public sector, weak democratic institutions 
and a closed economy. Decentralisation has a 
greater negative impact on corruption in 
unitary countries than in federal states. The 
study suggests that decentralisation supports 
greater accountability in the public sector and 
reduced corruption.  
 
Jenkins, R. & 
Goetz, A.M. 
1999 ‘Accounts and accountability: theoretical 
implications of the right-to-information 
movement in India.’ Third World Quarterly, 
Vol. 20 (3), pp. 603-622.  
Political 
science 
Descriptive with policy 
advice 
A small activist group in the north Indian state 
of Rajasthan has waged a campaign to secure 
the right of ordinary people to gain access to 
information held by government officials. The 
group has developed a radical interpretation of 
the notion that citizens have a right both to 
know how they are governed and to 
participate actively in the process of auditing 
their representatives. The article examines the 
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process by which this campaign emerged and 
the means by which it pursues its goals. It then 
analyses the implications of this experience, 
and the larger movement it has spawned, for 
contemporary debates in three areas: human 
rights, participatory development and anti-
corruption action.  
 
Klitgaard,  R., 
MacLean-
Abaroa, R. &  
Lindsey Parris, 
H.  
 
2000 Corrupt cities. A practical guide to cure and 
prevention. ICS Press and World Bank 
 
Multidiscp. 
(institutional 
economics/ 
development 
management)   
Case studies from New 
York, Hong Kong and 
La Paz. A toolkit for 
anti-corruption efforts 
The authors demonstrate ways of eliminating 
the problem with urban corruption. Based on 
case studies from various cities, the authors 
set forth strategies for (1) diagnosing 
municipal corruption; (2) involving citizens 
and government employees in discovering and 
implementing solutions; (3) attacking 
corruption from an economic angle, regarding 
it as a crime of calculation and as a function of 
corrupt systems rather than merely corrupt 
individuals; (4) eliminating and preventing 
corruption by adapting specified methods; and 
(5) avoiding pitfalls common to many reform 
efforts.  
 
Kuncoro, A. 2000 ‘The impact of licensing decentralization on 
firm location choice: the case of Indonesia.’ 
Faculty of Economics, University of Indonesia 
(mimeo).  
Economics Econometric model The study finds that with decentralisation of 
the administrative licensing system to 
provincial and district planning agencies, 
firms showed preferences for areas with lower 
bribes. More and more firms clustered in the 
old business centres, and led to a more 
centralised location pattern.   
 
Langseth, P.  1995 ‘Civil service reform in Uganda – lessons 
learned.’ Public Administration and 
Development Vol. 15 (4), pp. 365-390. 
Economics 
(institutional) 
Assessment of a reform 
programme. 
This article presents the Civil Service Reform 
Programme (CSRP) in Uganda. It outlines the 
context in which the CSRP is being 
implemented and establishes the link between 
the CSRP and other reform programmes, 
particularly constitutional decentralisation, 
liberalisation/privatisation and army 
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demobilisation. It also analyses the progress 
made so far, given certain obstacles, and 
makes some suggestions for the road ahead.  
Mana, B. 1999 ‘An anti-corruption strategy for provincial 
government in Papua New Guinea.’ Asia Pacific 
School of Economics and Management Working 
Papers Gov 99-5. Australian National 
University: Asia Pacific Press.  
Management A practical educational 
and training approach 
for anti-corruption 
measures.  
The paper examines the causes and 
characteristics of corruption at the provincial 
level in Papua New Guinea. It is argued that 
the 1995 decentralisation reforms only 
resulted in increased discretion among 
provincial governors (grand corruption) as 
well as increased competition among NGOs, 
leading to enhanced pressure for corrupt 
practices (petty corruption). In response, the 
author pleads for an integrated approach, 
including an independent anti-corruption 
commission at the provincial level, combined 
with education and training of local officers. 
 
Manor, J.  1999 The political economy of democratic 
decentralization. Washington D.C.: World 
Bank. 
Political 
science 
Book on 
decentralisation. 
Covering different 
issues.  
Manor argues that decentralisation ‘is always 
attended by an increase in the number of 
persons who are involved in corrupt acts’, 
although this need not imply that the overall 
amount of money diverted by corrupt means 
increases. 
 
Prud’homme, R.  1995 ‘The dangers of decentralization.’ The World 
Bank Research Observer, Vol. 10 (2), pp. 201-
220. 
 
Economics A controversial and 
widely cited critical 
assessment of economic 
impacts of 
decentralisation. 
Theoretical, with 
examples.  
Claims that there are probably more 
opportunities for corruption at the local level: 
Firstly, local officials usually have more 
discretionary powers than national decision-
makers. Secondly, local bureaucrats and 
politicians are likely to be more subject to 
pressing demands from local interest groups in 
matters such as taxation. 
Reinikka, R. & 
Svensson, J. 
2002b ‘Local capture and the political economy of 
school financing.’ DRC, The World Bank 
(mimeo, April). 
Economics Economic model 
analysed by panel data 
from a public 
expenditure tracking 
survey (PETS) of 
primary schools in 
The survey data reveal that during the period 
1991-95, the primary schools on average 
received only 13% of the grants from the 
central government. Most schools received 
nothing. The bulk of the school grant was 
captured by local officials and politicians, 
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Uganda either for private gain or for use for purposes 
other than education. The data also reveal 
considerable variations in grants received 
across schools, suggesting that rather than 
being passive recipients of flows from the 
government, schools may use their bargaining 
power to secure greater shares of funding. 
Three variables were found to be important in 
explaining the variation in capture across 
schools: (a) school size; (b) income; and (c) 
the extent to which teachers are qualified. 
Moreover, well-performing schools seem to 
attract visitors from the centre, and were, 
accordingly, ‘rewarded’ by local officials by 
receiving more capitation grants. 
 
Ruud, A. 
Engelsen 
2000 ‘Corruption as everyday practice: The public-
private divide in local Indian society.’  
Forum for Development Studies, Vol. 27 (2), pp. 
271-294.  
 
Social 
anthropology/ 
history 
Case study drawing on 
ethnographic material 
from West Bengal. 
The author argues that the networking that 
people indulge in as part of their survival 
strategies is not only culturally acceptable and 
saturated with cultural meaning as well as 
good common sense, it is  also a social practice 
with its own particular rules, winners and 
losers. To be able to 'play the game', to 'make 
a deal', and to 'manage' involves having many 
and important contacts. The more dexterous 
are the more successful. People generally 
dedicate much time and effort to maintaining 
vast networks as part of their coping 
strategies. Such networks are based on 
reciprocity – immediate or delayed, of the 
same kind or entirely different. These 
networks can be mobilised when need arises. 
At the outer ends, however, the 'contact' bond 
is wearing thin, and reciprocity becomes more 
immediate and more material. The state in 
India cannot be insulated from 'corruption', 
partly because of its limited resources and 
personnel, but more pointedly because its 
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command over bureaucrats, politicians and 
voters is insufficient to negate the spill-over to 
the realm of the state of practices that are 
culturally significant and embedded in 
everyday practices.  
 
Segal, L.  1999 ‘Corruption moves to the center: An analysis 
of New York's 1996 school governance law.’ 
Harvard Journal on Legislation, Vol. 36 (2), 
pp. 323-367. 
 
Law Case study The author discusses the recent trend of 
recentralisation in the New York City 
public school system. She first analyses the 
justifications given for decentralisation and 
examines the corruption and poor school 
performance that resulted from the new 
system. The author argues that while 
recentralisation efforts have attempted to 
combat these problems, the revamped 
system has also introduced the potential 
for new forms of corruption.  
 
Segal, L. 1997 ‘The pitfalls of political decentralization and 
proposals for reform: The case of New York 
City public schools.’ Public Administration 
Review, Vol. 57 (2), pp. 141-149.  
Law Case study How are politically decentralised 
programmes vulnerable to corruption and 
what can be done about it? This article 
identifies and analyses the structural 
features of decentralisation that invite, 
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facilitate, and even necessitate wrongdoing 
through a case study of the New York City 
public school system, where programme 
vulnerabilities have led to widespread, 
systemic corruption. The article makes 
detailed recommendations for ways to 
lessen these problems through institutional 
changes designed to curb corruption 
opportunities and reforms to strengthen 
deterrence without increasing burdensome 
rules and regulations. 
 
Shleifer, A. & 
Vishny, R.W. 
1993 ‘Corruption.’ The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, pp. 599–617. 
 
Economics Theoretical This seminal paper on corruption suggests that 
states with a very centralised institutional 
structure and those with a very decentralised 
one may suffer less from the damaging effects 
of corruption than states with an intermediate 
level of institutional centralisation.   
 
Tanzi, V.  2000a  ‘Fiscal federalism and decentralization: A 
review of some efficiency and macroeconomic 
aspects.’ In Proceedings of the Annual World 
Bank Conference on Development Economics, 
Washington D.C.: The World Bank, chapter 14, 
pp. 231-263. 
Economics Review article  Very much in line with Prud’homme (1995) –  
see above. 
Tanzi, V. 2000b ‘Some politically incorrect remarks on 
decentralization and public finance.’ In J.J. 
Dethier (ed.) Governance, decentralization and 
reform in China, India and Russia. Dordrecht: 
Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
Economics Review of the 
experiences with fiscal 
decentralisation of the 
IMF’s Fiscal Affairs 
Department. 
The paper discusses some issues of relevance 
to the decision whether to decentralise or not, 
and to the likelihood that decentralisation will 
produce useful results. Tanzi argues that 
decentralisation is more likely to be successful 
if some conditions are met before the process 
of decentralisation starts. Decentralisation can 
be a good policy if institutions related to tax 
policy, tax administration, and expenditure 
management systems and budgets work. 
Especially important are institutions that allow 
the central government to transfer resources to 
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local governments with some assurance that 
the resources will be used effectively and for 
the purpose for which they are passed on.  
These conditions for successful 
decentralisation are, however, often not in 
place. Thus, according to Tanzi, casual 
observations indicate that corruption is more 
widespread at the local than at the national 
level.  
Treisman, D. 2000a ‘Decentralization and the quality of 
government.’ Department of Political science, 
University of California, Los Angeles (mimeo).  
Political 
science 
Cross country 
regressions, using TI’s 
and the World Bank’s 
corruption indices, data 
on up to 154 countries  
States which have more tiers of government 
tend to have higher perceived corruption, and 
may also do a worse job of providing public 
services. The Tieboutian idea that decreasing 
the size of government units will strengthen 
competition between governments for capital, 
and thus stimulating greater efficiency and 
honesty, is not supported. Countries with 
smaller first-tier jurisdictions tend to be 
perceived as more corrupt.  
 
Treisman, D. 2000b ‘The causes of corruption: a cross national 
study.’ Journal of Public Economics, pp. 399-
457 
 
Political 
science 
Cross-country 
regressions, using TI’s 
CPI as the main 
dependent variable in 
the regressions. 
Treisman finds that federal states are more 
corrupt than unitary ones. He attributes this to 
the collective action problem for semi -
autonomous central and sub-national officials 
in decid ing how much to extract in bribes 
from businesses that both levels have the 
power to regulate. According to Treisman, 
competition between autonomous levels of 
government to extract bribes leads to 
‘overgrazing’ of the commons. In contrast, in 
unitary states more effective hierarchies of 
control enable central officials to limit the 
extraction of sub-national officials to more 
‘reasonable’ levels. If these interpretations are 
correct, caution must be raised in 
decentralising political power in poor 
countries that are susceptible to corruption. 
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USAID and 
World Bank 
2000 Corruption in Slovakia. Results of diagnostic 
surveys. Report prepared by James Andersson. 
http://www.government.gov.sk/english/dokume
ntary-en.html 
Economics Survey The survey of public officials finds that local 
governments are perceived to be less corrupt 
than central and regional governments.  
Wade, R. 1997 ‘How infrastructure agencies motivate staff: 
canal irrigation in India and the Republic of 
Korea.’ In A. Mody (ed.) Infrastructure 
strategies in East Asia. Washington DC: World 
Bank.  
Political 
economics/ 
development 
Case studies  The author suggests that the overcentralised 
top-down structure of the system in India is 
largely responsible for corruption in the 
irrigation bureaucracy. In contrast, stronger 
communication and monitoring mechanisms 
in Korea may explain the better delivery 
performance relative to India.  
 
Weingast, B.R. 1995 ‘The economic role of political institutions: 
market-preserving federalism and economic 
development.’ Journal of Law, Economics and 
Organization, pp. 1-31. 
 
Economics  The author argues that a federal state structure 
contributes to more honest and efficient 
government by providing for competition 
between sub-jurisdictions.  
Wilson, J.  1966 ‘Corruption: The shame of the states.’ The 
Public Interest, Vol. 2, pp. 28-38. Reprinted as 
chapter 35 in A. Heidenheimer, M. Johnston & 
V.T. Le Vine (eds.) 1997 Political Corruption. 
A Handbook. New Brunswick/London: 
Transaction Publishers 
Political 
science 
A broad and engaged 
feature article on 
corruption, with 
reference to the United 
States.  
Wilson argues that one cause of the corruption 
in the US system is the need to exchange 
favours to overcome decentralised authority. 
 
  
Summary 
The main objective of this study is to assess existing 
knowledge on decentralisation and corruption. Major 
controversies within and across disciplines are discussed. The 
review concludes by identifying some areas in most need for 
further research with an emphasis on questions relevant for 
development policy.  
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